When the Signal Dies: From Technological Dependence to Organisational Vulnerability

Some months ago, I wrote about the risks created by growing technological dependence in humanitarian security - from communications blackouts and GPS disruption to the gradual loss of analogue backup options.

The concern has not gone away. If anything, it has become even more acute.

The question is no longer simply what happens when the technology fails. It is what happens when organisations become so accustomed to technological support that the underlying skills, systems and judgement begin to weaken.

Organisations are increasingly dependent on digital systems for communications, navigation, tracking, reporting, incident management, access control, information sharing and operational oversight.

Digital systems have brought real benefits. Vehicle tracking is a good example. Systems that record location, speed and driving behaviour can help reduce unnecessary mileage and idling, identify speeding and harsh driving, improve maintenance and, when the information is actively used, reduce fuel consumption and road safety risk.

The issue, therefore, is not that technology has failed humanitarian security. Quite the opposite.

The danger arises when a useful tool becomes a capability without which the organisation can no longer function.

The disappearance of backup capability

Greater technological capability does not automatically mean greater resilience.

When mobile networks go down, satellite signals are disrupted, electricity becomes unreliable or online platforms are inaccessible, the operational impact can be immediate.

A vehicle tracking system is of little value if its position data cannot be trusted. A communications tree means little if all of its branches rely on the same network. A crisis management platform is of limited value if the people expected to use it cannot access it during the crisis.

Resilience is therefore not simply about owning backup equipment. It is about retaining the skills and procedures required to use it.

An HF radio stored in a cupboard is not a backup measure if nobody remembers how to operate it. A paper evacuation map is not particularly useful if staff have never practised navigating without GPS. A backup communication plan exists only on paper if teams have never tested it.

Backup systems need to be exercised precisely because they are used infrequently.

When the system is confidently wrong

The recent conflict involving Iran has provided another stark reminder of the dangers of technological dependence.

Significant GNSS/GPS interference has been recorded across the Strait of Hormuz approaches, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf. UK Maritime Trade Operations reported widespread jamming and spoofing, with several hundred commercial vessels displaying abnormal positional behaviour. Some electronic tracks indicated unrealistic speeds, sudden displacement or vessels apparently travelling across land.

There is an important distinction between jamming and spoofing.

Jamming tells the user that the system is no longer working.

Spoofing is potentially more dangerous because the system continues to provide an answer, but the answer is wrong.

That distinction matters far beyond navigation.

Modern security management increasingly depends on systems that collect, process and interpret information for us. Tracking platforms tell us where people are. Dashboards show incidents and movements. Algorithms identify patterns. Increasingly, artificial intelligence can summarise reports, structure assessments and suggest conclusions.

The challenge, therefore, is not simply maintaining alternatives for when technology stops working.

It is retaining the knowledge and confidence to recognise when technology appears to be working perfectly, but is wrong.

AI takes the question one step further

Artificial intelligence can already help process large volumes of information, translate reporting, identify patterns, draft assessments and support scenario development.

Used well, that can save considerable time. But the same resilience question applies.

What happens when analysts begin relying on AI-generated summaries rather than reading the underlying reporting? What happens when managers become accustomed to machine-generated assessments and gradually lose confidence in producing their own?

AI systems are very good at producing answers that sound coherent.

Security decisions, however, are often made in situations where information is contradictory, political, incomplete or deliberately misleading.

Sometimes the most important professional skill is not producing an answer quickly, but recognising when the available information does not justify one.

AI can support judgement.

It should not replace it.

Human networks remain infrastructure

There is another form of resilience that receives much less attention: people.

Trusted drivers, local colleagues, community contacts, field coordinators, programme teams and local authorities often provide information that never appears on a dashboard. They notice changes in atmosphere, behaviour and relationships. They know who can be contacted when official channels stop working.

These networks are not informal extras. They are operational infrastructure.

But they require time to build and maintain.

One risk of shrinking security teams and increasing workloads is that this less visible work gets squeezed out. The meeting that does not appear urgent is postponed. The field visit is replaced by a call. A change in mood or behaviour goes unnoticed because the person who might have noticed it is dealing with reporting, travel approvals, incidents and multiple competing priorities.

Technology can help people see more information.

It cannot give them more time to understand it.

And it cannot build a relationship on their behalf.

Resilience needs to be designed

The objective should not be to reject technology or slow its adoption.

It should be to design systems that remain functional when technology becomes unavailable, unreliable or compromised.

That means asking uncomfortable but practical questions.

Can teams continue operating if mobile networks disappear for 24 hours?

Can movements still be managed if GPS is unreliable?

Can a crisis team function without its online platform?

Do staff know alternative communications procedures?

Can managers produce a risk assessment without automated tools?

Can an organisation challenge an AI-generated conclusion rather than simply accept it?

And do staff have enough time and space to maintain the relationships and situational awareness on which good security decisions ultimately depend?

Perhaps most importantly: are these capabilities tested?

A contingency that has never been practised is largely theoretical.

Technology should strengthen capability, not replace it

Humanitarian security has always depended on adaptability.

Technology has expanded what organisations can see, communicate and analyse. Vehicle tracking, satellite communications, digital mapping and increasingly artificial intelligence all offer capabilities that previous generations of security professionals would have welcomed.

The question is not whether we should use them.

We should.

The question is what happens to the organisation underneath them.

Resilience comes from retaining the ability to operate when systems are unavailable, from preserving the judgement needed to recognise when technology is wrong, and from giving people enough capacity to maintain the relationships and understanding that technology cannot reproduce.

The strongest organisations will not be those with the most sophisticated systems.

They will be those capable of functioning both with them and without them.

Basic may not be better.

But it works.

This article develops an earlier piece, “When the Signal Dies: Rethinking Tech Reliance in Humanitarian Security”, originally published on LinkedIn.

Selected sources

• UK Maritime Trade Operations / Joint Maritime Information Center (16 March 2026), JMIC Advisory Note 16: GNSS/GPS interference, spoofing and jamming across the Strait of Hormuz approaches, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf.
• Toledo, G. and Shiftan, Y. (2016), “Can feedback from in-vehicle data recorders improve driver behavior and reduce fuel consumption?”, Transportation Research Part A, 94:194–204.

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